Abstract: This paper concerns the provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model under present-biased consumer preferences. The preference for immediate gratification facing the high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.
Introduction
Over the last decades, numerous studies have reported strong evidence suggesting that people and animals have "present-biased" preferences, i.e. a tendency to give less weight to the future welfare consequences of today's actions than would be optimal for the individual himself/herself in a longer time-perspective (see, e.g., Thaler, 1981; Mazur, 1987; Kirby, 1997; Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 2008; Brown, Chua and Camerer, 2009 ). Present-biased preferences might be exemplified by quasi-hyperbolic discounting, where the individual, at any time t , attaches a higher utility discount rate to tradeoffs between periods t and t  1 than to similar tradeoffs in the more distant future. Viscusi, Huber and Bell (2008) have studied discounting of the benefits attached to a public good, exemplified by water quality. Based on a representative U.S. sample of 2,914 respondents, they estimate the "quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter" (referred to as "  " below) to be in the interval 0.48-0.61. This suggests that the weight given to benefits in period t  1 , relative to benefits in period t , is roughly half of the weight that consumers in period t give to benefits in period t  2 relative to benefits in period t  1 .
The purpose of this short paper is to examine how a paternalistic government would modify the policy rule for public good provision in response to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We focus on a state-variable public good, as many real world public goods, such as, e.g., different aspects of environmental quality, have this particular character. Our study is based on an overlapping generations (OLG) model with two ability-types, where each individual lives for three periods (the minimum number of periods to address quasi-hyperbolic discounting). The government is assumed to carry out redistribution under asymmetric information by means of nonlinear labor and capital income taxation as well as provide the state-variable public good referred to above. Therefore, our concern will be to study the supplemental role of public provision when the income taxes are optimal.
The Model and Main Results
Consider an OLG economy where each consumer lives for three periods; works in the first two and becomes a pensioner in the third. 
, whereas all time is spent on leisure when old, so z 2,t2
The intertemporal objective of ability-type i of generation t is given by
  t is a conventional exponential discount factor with utility discount rate  (the same for everybody), whereas
1 is a type-specific and time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratification. 4 Let s denote saving and r the interest rate. We abstract from bequests, meaning that the intial wealth of each consumer is zero. The budget constraint faced by ability-type i of generation t can then be written as follows;
where the price of the consumption good has been normalized to one. The variables
and T
2,t2
i represent the income tax payments made when young, middle-aged and old, respectively, which are nonlinear functions of income. Although the optimal use of income taxation will not be examined here, we assume that the income tax system is flexible in the sense of allowing the government to control, the consumption, labor supply and savings behavior of each ability-type.
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To simplify, we follow much earlier literature in assuming that output is produced by a linear technology, which is interpreted to mean that the factor prices (wage rates and interest rate) are exogenous. The public good evolves according to the following difference equation; 4 It would add no important insight into the consequences of quasi-hyperbolic discounting if we were to assume that the conventional utility discount factor differs between ability-types. Aronsson and Sjögren (2009) analyze the optimal use of income and commodity taxation by a paternalistic government when the consumers apply quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
where g t is the incremental provision (or investment in the public good) in period t , while   0, 1 reflects the depreciation factor.
Turning to public policy, our concern is to analyze the optimal provision of the state-variable public good when decided upon by a paternalistic government; therefore, we assume that  l   h  1 from the point of view of the government. 6 The objective of the government is represented by a utilitarian social welfare function. The contribution of ability-type i of generation t to this social welfare function becomes
and the social welfare function is written as
We will later compare the policy rule for public provision following this paternalistic approach with the policy rule that would be chosen by a welfarist government (that respects the individual preferences for immediate gratification).
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government can observe labor and capital income, whereas ability is private information. We focus on the "normal case", where the government attempts to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. As a consequence, the government must prevent the high-ability type from becoming a mimicker. This can be formalized by introducing a self-selection constraint
where U 0,t h denotes the utility of the mimicker. We assume that an individual who reveals himself/herself to be a high-ability type when young cannot credibly pretend to be a low-ability type when middle-aged, which means that the decision of whether or not to become a mimicker is taken by the young high-ability type. The mimicker faces the same income-consumption combinations as the low-ability type; however, as the 6 This assumption is in line with earlier comparable literature on optimal paternalism; see, e.g., O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) and Aronsson and Thunström (2008) . mimicker is more productive, he/she spends more time on leisure than the low-ability type.
For all t , the resource constraint is written
is the capital stock at the beginning of period t , and p t is a fixed marginal cost of public provision interpretable as the marginal rate of transformation between the incremental public good and the private consumption good in period t . The decision-problem facing the government is to maximize the social welfare function presented in equation (), subject to the accumulation equation for the public good, the self-selection constraint and the resource constraint given by equations (), () and (), respectively. The Lagrangean corresponding to this optimization problem becomes Since the government can control the private consumption and work hours by each ability-type via the tax system, it is convenient to write the second best problem as a direct decision-problem (where the government decides upon private consumption and work hours instead of tax parameters). This approach is standard in the literature on optimal nonlinear taxation. See also earlier literature on optimal income taxation in dynamic economies; e.g., Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) .
When the young high-ability type decides whether or not to become a mimicker, he/she attaches less weight to the future utility consequences of today's actions than he/she would have done in the absence of the self-control problem (as the utilities facing the young consumer's middle-aged and old selves are multiplied by  h  1 ). As a consequence, the welfare contribution of public provision that goes via MRS
is only a fraction of the corresponding effect that would follow without the preference for immediate gratification, which explains the first part of Corollary 1. The final part follows because the preference for immediate gratification facing the low-ability type does not directly affect the self-selection constraint. In other words, self-control problems facing mimicked agents (who are not potential mimickers themselves) will not modify the policy rule for the public good.
In the special case where   0 , in which the public good becomes a flow variable, equation () reduces to read p t  SMBG t , meaning that the forward-looking benefit measure reduces to a static measure. The qualitative effects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting will, nevertheless, remain as in Corollary 1:  h still affects the policy rule via the self-selection constraint faced by the middle-aged, and  l does not modify the policy rule for a flow-variable public good.
